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1

I NTR ODUO fI O)l

The Zero-sum Two-person Game
ConsIder a contest among a set 01' players, where the
skill ot the players'and, posslb17, chance events effect the
outcom.e.Oall the set ot all rules 01' the contest the

SaDle,

and any particular oourse the contest may take, trom. beginning to end, a :elil-

Suppose the game presoribes, for any

play, payments to the players.

Profits are denoted by

positive payments, and losses shown by negative payments.
It 1s assumed that at most a tinite number of situations can arise in the contest. and,at each Situation, at
most a finite number at alternatives is available to the
player or chance device nlaking the choice in this situation.

'men, eaoh ot the players oan speoify, previous to a play of
the oontest, exaotly which ohoice will be made tor every
possible situation in which he might have an option_
Into~nation

All

allowable under the game can be inoluded as a

basiS tor a choice, so this pre... specification entails no
disadvantage to the player,.

A complete --exhaust! ve and

unambiguous-,. set ot such choices 1s oalled a. atra.teSl. ana.
under the assumptIons made above, there is at most a tinite
number ot strategies tor eaoh player.
It ohance events nmy effect the outcome of the contest t

oonsider all possible situations where a chance device may
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make a choioe, and select one ot these choices arbItrarily.
Call a complete set of' such choioes an :wp;p&re's ohoice, and,
trom the assumptions above. there is at most a tinite number
ot umpire's choloes.

Let the probabilIties tor any chance

device's making its choioes

be

known.

'l~en.

the probability

ot ocourrenoe tor any umpire's choioe can be tound.
It each ot the players selects a. strategy. and an
UL~pire's

choice is ohosen, a play ot the contest oan be eon-

structed, and payments assigned to the players.

Sinoe an

umpire's cholce has a detinite probability ot ooourrenoe, all
possible umpire's ohoices can be Gonaldered, tor a tixed set
ot players' strategies, and the mathematioal expeotation ot

the payments oan be oalculated.

Thus, tor eaoh set ot strat-

egies selected by the players, a set at payments (in the
sense at expectation) oan be assisned the players.
When the contest is between two players, its rules are

oalled a

two-~erson

game.

wben the sum at the payments is

zero tor every possible play under the game, it is called a
zero-sum game.

A

zero-sum two-person game desoribes a con-

test between two players where ona player wins exaotly the
same pay:ment that the other player loses.

Each player

selects a strategy, and the ga:me then specities a payment
which one player must make to the other.

Let players Px and Py enter a contest under a twoperson zero-sum game. Suppose Px has m possible strategies,
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labeled l,2, ••• ,m, and Py has n possible strategies, called
l.2 ••••• n. Let the payment to Px be Px' and the payment to
Py be

or

N

Py'

Call the set of all strategies for eaoh player M

respectively, with a typical element 1 or J.
tJ~ft

reading
1~en,

as "is (be) an elemen' ot Q , one oan write
M. (l,I, ••• ,m), J ( • • (l,I, ••• ,n).

~

1

'rhat Is,

the desoription above becomes,
Px • px(I,J), Py • py(l,J), px(l,J) • - py (l,j).
11'01'

convenience, detinet
81J • px(i.J) • • Py(l,J), i ~ M, j ~ N,

A • (81j ).
The domains ot 1 and J are independent ot each other, and
A

is an m by n matrix, called a RlX9tt matrlx.

A:JlY'

row ot A

strategy selection by Px' while any column ot A
represents a seleotion ot a strategy by Fy • It both players
Identities

a.

want to realize a. most tavorable outcome, Px w1l1 wish to
maximize, and Py will want to mintmlze, the entry ot A which
·is ultimately seleoted by the intersection ot the row and
oolumn ohosen by each ot the players.
In a certain rational sense (1, pp. 98), a theory can be

developed tor some, but not all, sames in the tormulation
given above.

However, the adoption of a decisive new oonoept

in strategy selection will permit a rational theory which
includes all zero-sum two-person games.
Ithe

consideration ot certain simple games, such as
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matchins pennies (1, pp. 143), shows that a player may be
outwi tte4 an4 punished 11' he is required to fHf)lect, on the
basis 01' his own reasoning, a partioular strategy tor a play

ot a oontest.

In view ot this it 1s demanded only that a

player state the probability with which he will playa

particular strategy.

That ls, instead ot seleoting a strat-

egy, let the player select a probability tor playing eaoh ot
all posslble strategies.

Call the probability 01' Px playing
the ith strategy Xl' and the probab11ity 01' Py playing the
Jth strategy 7J*

The oollection of Xl is a vector in

~.

Euolidean m spaoe, and the colleot1on ot Yj 1s a vector in
En' say

x • (Xi)' Y - (73).
It the players seleot the sets ot probabilities, x and
7, tor playing their strategies, the expeoted value tor the
payoff will be

(1)

where the oonvention of summing r.pee.ted indices through
their domains ot detinition is adopte4.
The sets x and y must be seta ot mutually exclusive
and exhaustive probabilities.

Use the detinitions.

81- 1 tor all!, e .. (e1)' E" (e1J) • (.1 e j).

Then, the conditions on x and y become
xe - X1ei- 1, 8y - 837 3- 1,

Xi

~

0 tor all 1, YJ

~

0 tor all J.
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(2)
(2a)

Il'he

vectors x and y are oal.led m1x!d 8trat,e6ies.

Let

X be the set ot all x satisfying (2) and (28.), and Y be the
set ot all y satistying (2) and (2a).

Em and

~

The unit veotors ot

are elements ot X and Y respectively.

veotors are called m!£l

straie~'I,

These unit

and represent an actual

row or oolumn selection ot A. Heaoe, mixed strategies
inolude all the previous notions on strategy selection.

It

turns out that the concept ot mixed strategies will permit
the formulation ot a rational theory tor the playing ot any

Properties ot Games
It Is assumed that the reader Is aoquainted with the
notions ot geometric convexity (1. pp_ 128) and the tunctional operators
A

Maxx

and

Minx

(1, Pl>. 88).

statement ot the utmost importance in the theory ot

games is due originally to john von Neumann.

It is stated

here without proof (1, pp. 153).

Theorem.

(Main Theorem tor zero-sum two-person games.)

Let A be an arbItrary real matrix.

x· ( X, y.

~

Then there exist veotors,

Y, and a real number, A, such that ror every

x E. X, Y ~ Y,
(3)
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In game terms, this theorem as.erts that Px has a mixed

strategy, x·, whioh will gUarantee a payott ot not less than
At

while PY' has a mixed strategy, 1'., which will guarantee

a payoff of not more than A.

Thu., 6 is a point ot impasse,

beyond whioh neither player need be allowed by an opponent.
This point ot impasse. 6, is oalled the v@iue at the same A.
A

strategy. x· or

y., which guarantees that an opponent will

not be allowed a more favorable payoft than A is called an
oRtlmal strategz_ A pair ot such strategies. x· and 1'. is
oalled a sO.Btion.
all yO be Y·

It

Let the set ot all x· be X·, the set at

To emphasize the dependenoe at A, XO t yo on A,

they may be written, A(A), XG(A). YO(A).
Using these detinitions, the Main Theorem states that
every zero-sum two-person game haa a value, and eaoh player
has an optimal strategy which guarantees

hlIIl

that value.

In a certain,sense, rational playing implies the use ot the
optimal strategies, and the value ot the game represents a
measure ot the utility of the game itself to the players.
A

game which has zero value is called a tail" game,.
11118 main problem in the theory of the zero-su:m two-

person games at the present time 1s to find methods tor
obtaining the

va~ue

and sets of optimal strategies ror a

given game.
Some well known properties ot games are given here. with
demonstrations when space permits, and reterelloes otherwise.
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ProPtrll 1, The Main 'rheorem can be given in the following
equivalent torms.
A.
x·

~

Let A be arbitrary.

'rhen there ekist vectors,

X, yO ( Y, and a number, A, such that,
~

X01813
B.

A tor all 3. a13 1 ·3
Then,

there exist veotors x·

x·A,.

~

x·Ay°

(3A)

~

~

has a saddle point.

"KAy

That is,

X, yO ( Y such that,

xAyO tor ev.ry x ( x, Y ( Y.

(3B)

Let A be arbitrary, and the domain ot x be X, the

domain ot y be Y.

Then,

~nyXAY

Properxl 3 f
A.

A for all 1.

Let Abe arbitrary, and the domain ot x be X, the

domain ot ,. be Y.

O.

~

lilt

M1ty'faXz;XA7.

(30)

Let A and B be two games, y be a real number.

Let B .. A ... yEt

Then, 6(B) .. A(A ... yIO .. ,6(A) ... y.

X·(B) .. X·(A) , YO(D) .. YO(A).

B. Let y> 0, B .. yA.

Then, ACB) .. ACrA) .. YD(A) ,

XO(D) .. XOCA), YO(B} .. Y·(A).
Demonstration ot Property lA.
chosen by means ot the i4ain 'rheorem.

x01a13

~

Let x· ( X· and A be
It the relation,

A tor all j,

tails, suppose it tails tor

j ..

k.

Let yt be defined as
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a
Y'k

/II

1, yt 3

• 0 tor J ., k.Then yt

x·A.,' ..

XOt8.tjY· j

/II

4f,

Y, and

XOi&1k

1:. A.

But the statement of the M.ain tl'heorem is precisely the
relation denied above, hence the property Is shown as it
regards to x.

A symmetric argument will apply tor y.

Demonstration ot Property lB,
let x

/II

x·

~

X·, .,

/II

y.

x·Ay·

~

6

Then, (3) becomes,

yo,

~

x°Ay., or

~

In the Main Theorem,
A

/II

x°Ayo,

substituting this relation back 1nto (3), one obtains (SB),
whioh defines a saddle pOint (1, p. 95).
Reference tor Property 10.

(1, pp. 95).

Demonstration ot Property 2.
Let x·

~

o~ a S

X·,

xot ~

xo,

x·flAy

Hence, x· ft

~

:leo,

Then it must be shown that when

ttx·

1, then XOfl •

OU1Y'oonvexlty 1s shown.

~

+ (1 ... a)x·'

XO.

/II

(ax· + (1 ... «)x·'lAy,

/II

ax°Ay' +(1 ... a)x~"Ay,

~

aA

+

(1 - a)A

/II

Let., ( Y. Than

~.

A symmetriC argument holds tor yo,

P'or the assertion that X· and Y· are hyper-polyhedra,
See (2, pp. 3) and (2, p. 34).

The statement appears to be

plausible through an examination ot the form. ot Property lA,
It Is easy to see there, that X·, tor instance, is the intersection ot the m + n halt-spaces,
Xitiij

Xi

~~.
~

tor all j,

0, tor all i.
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and the hyperplane, ex • 1.
Demonstration ot Property 3A.
~

yO

YO(A).

Then, tor every x
x°Ay

Let

X, Y

~

~

XO(A),

XO ~

Y,

> b{A) > XAY o •

-

-

Add Y to each member, and use the tact that tor every

x

~

X. Y ~ Y, xEY. (x8)(ey) • 1.

Then,

XO Ay ... yxoEy ~ A(A) ... yo ~ XAy0 ... yxEy.,

x·(A ... rEly
rJ~he

~ ~(A)

... Y ~ x(A ... rE)yo.

last torm demonstrates that x·

A(D) • A(A)

+

y.

It XO

~

~

XO(B), yO

demonstration will show that XO

E.,

X· (B), yO
€,

€,

yo (B) ,

YO(B}, a similar

X·(A), y.

€,

YO(A).

Hence, the respective sets a.re identical.
Demonstration ot Property 5B.

Since y > 0, the

three members in the statement ot the Main Theorem can be
multiplied by y without altering the inequalities.

'£.hen,

the arguments used in Froperty 5A can be duplioated.

Summary
In the second ohapter, a bilinear expansion is
developed with a two-told purpose.

First, the expansion

is an aid in the computation ot optimal strategies and

values tor certain games.

In addition, the expansion

provides a basis tor the classitication and comparison
of various games.

While the derivation is algebraio in
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charaoter, the set ot all expansion points is shown to be
exactl~

the set ot all extremal points ot the oonstrained

bilinear form obtainable by the method ot LaGrange multipliers.

However, additional treedom is obtained over ana-

lytic expansions by requiring that the expansion be identioal to the bilinear :function only in the intersection ot
the hyper-planes ex • 1, and ey • 1.
Some ot t11e main results ot the paper are obtained in
the third ohapter, where ooncepts ot pun.ish.llent, limbo. and
reward are used to develope crite;ria tor playing a game.
All games are divided into two clasees by these oonoepts,
and a complete description

or

game can be given within the

the solutions and value ot any

tr~.work

ot these oonoepts.

An operator, which arises naturally in the bilinear

expansion, is treated in the fourth chapter.

'Ms operator

div1des all games ot a given s1ze into equivalence classes,
and the properties at these classes exhibit characteristics
which seem pertinent to game theory.
In the fifth chapter, areas are pointed out which might
be traotable with an extension ot the analysis.

;Uso, a

game occurring elsewhere in the literature is analyzed, and
the ooncepts ot punishrllent, lhllbo. and reward are displayed

in this example.
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A BILIliEAR EXPANSION

In this chapter, an expression, valid tor a certain
olass ot matrices, will be round which has funotional values
identical to xA1 when x and yare restricted by (2).
conditions tor existence tor such an expression

If.he

found,

a~e

and a oomparison is laade with analytic expansions.
Set notation will be used.
or empty, set.

In context, 0 1s the null,

The interseotion Of sets X and Y, written XI,

implies that it z

~

XI, then z

~

X and z ( Y.

Derivation
Consider the bilinear torm,
%Ay • x18iJYJ' 1 ~ M, j ~ N,
where x and y satisty,

(1)
(2)

Call the set ot all x which satisty (2)
all y whioh satisty (2) Y'.
Y is a s\lbset of

Thus. X is a subset of Xt

by replaoing the component
r,~

,

and

X'.

By means ot (2), detine a veotor,

v;here

X', and the set of

xp

xP •

(xPi)' formally

in x by (1 - XUeu)' a

is the set M with p deleted.

~

Mp.

'!'hat is,

xPa • xu' xPp • 1 .... Xaeo.' Ct t; ~.
In a silnilar manner, using Nq as the set N with q deleted.

define a vector, yq • (yqjl, by,
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yq~ .. y~, yqq .. 1 - e~Ye' ~ ~ Nq •

Also, let a set ot numbers wpq '
satisty,

w"

(wpq ), p

~

~

M, q

N,

(4)

Lemma 1,

Let x ( X', Y ~ Y'.
xAy ..

Then,

WpqxPAJ'q.

By the construoti on gi Yen t wtlen

Proot.

:x:

~

X'. Y [~ Y',

x • xP, 1 .. yq, XPArq .. %Ay.
Then,

Lemm~

2.

A neoessary and sutticient condition that
XPArq .. P + (x .. u)H(y - v)

is that the following relations hold tor 1 ( M. J
H • (111j), h1j .. alJ .. alq - &pJ
U .. (Ut>, ui hi3 .. a pq " .p3'
v ..

Nt

(6)

.pq'

(7)

(V3)' hi3 v 3 .. ap~ .. a1q'
p + Ul hijVj ..

Proof.

+

~

(5)

(8)

a,q-

(9)

First, write xPJ\yq out as

xPAyQ. .. xaaafiYfl + (1 - xu_a: hip~Yf3 ... xaa(lq (1 .. epYe)-

MP'

... (1 .. xaea1.pq{1 - e~Y~)t tt (
~ ~
Then, rearrange this expression, with the reSult,
xPJ\1q ...pq - xu(apq .. ~q) - (apq .. a~)rf3
... xa(8ue - Baq - ape + .pq)Yfl' a ~

Mp. f3

Nq •

~ Nqe

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13

It is easy to verity the tact that the domains of a and

e

Can be formally extended to include p and q respectively,
tor having done so, the ooetfioients ot
identioallY' zero.

xp

and Yq beoome

Now, consider the tON,

K .. P + (Xi ... 111) h13 hi'J ... v J ) t

.. P + uihiJVj ... xihiJvJ ... ul hiJ1J + Xl hljvJ.
K and xPAyq are polynomials in the same variable (vaouously
in

xp

and Yq) and will be identical it and only if their

ooefficients are equated.

Relatioh.s (6) t ('1) t (8), and (9)

are the statements ot those equalities.
Relations ('1) and (8) do not determine up or v q •
detinitions are taken to be,
11e .. 1, ev .. 1.

'rheir
(10)

Let the set ot all u satistying (7) and (10) be U, and the
set ot all v satisfYing (8) and (10) be V.
Lemma 3,

Let U , 0, V , O. Then, U, V, and p are all

In addition,

independent ot the indioes p and q.
u

~

U it and only it 11 satisties (10) and

J

11i(8.1.1 ... aik) .. 0,1 E. M,
V ~

f,.

Nt any tixed k ~ N.

('It)

V it and only it v satisties (10) and
(ai 3 ... akj)"J .. O. i

~ M.

J

any tixed k

Ii, !-l,

E,

M,

and tinally,
p ..

uAv. u

~

U. v

~

V.
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Proot.

It (6) and (10) are used 1n (7),
ul(alj .. alq .. s.pJ + Bpq> • ~q ...pj'
ui(a!j .. alq) ... Ul e l(S.pq .. 8 pJ l • 8.pq .. a p 3'
ul(aiJ .. alq) ....pq .. s.pJ • apq .. Spj_

'I'hat Is,

Ui{Sij .. Siq) • 0, 1 ( M, j
Let

j •

~

N.

k. any fixed element ot :N and subtraot trom above,

ui(aij .. 8iq) .. ui(aik .. S.iq) • ui(aij .. aik) • o.
All operations used in the reduotion are reversible, hence
(7t) oan be used with (6) and (10) to obtain (7), and (7')
is thus equivalent to (7).

The tor.m ot (7') shows that U

is independent ot p and q.

A symmetric argument and

v.

reduction will demonstrate the asaertlons tor

Vfuen U ; 0, V ; 0, the relation slven by (5) exIsts,

tor hij and p are polynomial tuno'ions of 8ij' ui' Vj and
always exist tor.mally.
x (

X', Y (

Let x • u ( UJ Y • V

~

V.

Then,

yt, and the conditions ot Lemma 1 are satistied.

Using this substitution, then, one obtains,
UAT • uPAvq • P ... (u .. ulRev .. v) • p.
Irhis torm shows that p is independent ot P and q.
By Lemma 3, the entire dependenoe on p and q ot the

relation given in Lemma 2 is oontained in B.

With this in

mind, let the notation tor H be altered to Hpq • (hpqIj),
~qlj • &lj - 6iq ...pJ + ~q.
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An inspeotion ot (6') shows that,

hpqlj .. hljpq ..... hpJlq ..... htqpj'
and, as was notEJd ill Lemm.a 2,
~qpj

.. hpq1q .. Dpq,pq .. O.
Let a linear combination ot Hpq oye~ the indices p and q
with coefficients from W restricted

by

(4) be written as,

(11)

Let t be an arbitrary vector in
vector in En-

Em,

and g be an arbitrary

Then, two additional types of matrices are

defined as,

(12)
F is a matrix at constant rows, while G has constant columns.

Lemma 4;.

Let X E. X', Y E. yt,

U f..

tT, v

~ V, C f.. (E,F,G).

Then

(x .. u)C(y .. v) .. O.
IJroof.

When 0 .. E,

(x ... u)E(Y", v) .. (ex. eu)(ey - ev),
.. (1 .. 1) (1 ... 1)
.. (0) (0) .. O.

lfilhan 0 .. Jr, the right zero tactor exhibIted above will again
be zero, and when 0 .. G, the lett zero factor will again be

Let D, i, Jr, and G be defined as above, and y be an arbitrary
number.

Then,
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(13)

B .. D • yE ... F + G

1s a mapping ot A which is a tunc'lon 01' W, y, i, and g.
wrlttenout, an entry at B in (13) 1s,
blJ .. wpq (alJ .. 8.Iq .. 8.p J ....pq) + y ... 1'1+ Sj'
and 1s formallzed as,
B- 'l'{WIJ,y,fl 'SJ)A .. 'l(W,y,t,g)A" *fA.
Call the set ot all m.atr1ces .atl.tying (13) T(A).
The reader may note that

TCA)

may be written as the

set 01' all matrices ot the form A ... F' • Gt, where Jr' and
Gt are arbItrary 01' the type detiDed in (12).

However, the

arguments ot T w111 be seen u1t.1mately to d1splay oertain
charaoteristics 01' the matrix· TA whloh seem pertinent to
the invest1gation.

~'or

this reason, the 1'irst tormulation

is chosen, though it Is, adm1ttedly, more oomplex.
~12lem 1.

Let U ; 0, V ; O.

It u ~ U, v e-. V. B €. T(A) ,

and x (X' t Y E. 'It., then.

XA1
Proof.

-u.Av ...

ex . . u).8(y .. v).

(14)

Use Lemma 1, to obtain,

xA'¥ .. wpqxPAtl,
whioh can be wrItten, by means at Lemma 2 and Lemma 3,
x.A:y - Wpq (p ... (x .. u)Bpq ty

...

v) •

.. uAv + (x ... u)D{zr .. v) .•

By Lemma 4. yE + F + G Oan be added vaouously to D.
XAy •

uAv + (x • uJB(y .. v).
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Hence,

1'1

Lemma 5.

U; 0 it and only If th.re exists no t satisfying.
At ... , et ..

o.

(7.)

v ; 0 lr and only ir there exists no s satisf'ying,
sA .. e, se ..

o.

(Be)

U; 0 it and only it the ooetflcient and augmented

Proof.

matrices in relations (7 t

)

and (10) have the

s~~e

rank.

No

linear oombination at the right sIde of (7') oan give the

right side of (lO).

Hence, U ; 0 it and only it there exists

no set or numbers, tjt J

E.

Nt suoh that,

(o.i3 - alk)tj .. 1

tor all 1.

It such a set ot numbers does exist, multiply these rel8:'"
tions by t k • and sum over k, with the result,
- s'lft.jektk ... aiktkejtJ .. ektk-

'£he lett side at this is easily a.en to be zero, henoe,

8t ..

o.

Use this tact in the first expression, and obtain,
(813- slk)tJ .. aiJtj .. &1ke Jtj .. 1 tor all 1.

The seoond term ot the oenter member is zero, and.

At

l1li

e.

Thus, it U .. 0, a t exists, satisfying (7e).

On the

other hand. let t exist satistylns ('Ie), then,
and U • O.

(&13 - a1k)t j • alJ t J .. 1,
Hence U .. 0 it and only it there arleta a. t

satistying ('Ie)

tollows

J

and the first statement of the Lemma

in~d1ately.

A symmetric argument holds tor V.
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The statement ot Lemma 5 gives conditions tor the
existence ot the expression given in Irheorem 1.

When

it

is

square,the conditions reduoe to the taot that the sum at

the cotactors ot A must not be zero.

Oomparison with Analytio Expansions

The torm ot·the expression in '!I}).eorem 1 suggests a
oomparison with analytic expansions ot XAyabout extremal
points in X' and yf.

Lemm! 6,

A

~

T(A).

In particular, let W satisty (4). Then.

A .. T(W1j,-Wpqapq,ElpWpqa!qtWpqeqSpJ)A.

Proot.

A typical entry ot an ele.mentotT(A) 1s

b13 .. wpq (alJ .... aiq .... spJ + &pq) + Y + t1 + 8J.
• 81J + (- .pWpqBiq + til + (- Wpqe q8p J + 8J)
+ (wpqapq + y).

Now y, t. and g are completely arbi tra17.

'rhus. tor any

tixed W, the last three terms ot the latter express10n will
vanish it a suitable set ot definitions is taken tor y, t.
and g.

Such a set is displayed in the arguments of T in the

statement ot the theorem.

It the method at LaGrange multipliers 1s used to tind
extremal p01nts in X' and Y' at xAr, w1th multipliers a and
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~,

the extremal pointe, u' and

V',

satisfy these relations,

u'A • ae, u'e • 1,

Ay' • ae, av' .. 1.
Let the set ot all such u' be

v' be V'.

and the set ot all such

It U' r} 0, Y' r} 0, the analytic expansion is,

ZAr .. utAv'
Lemma

ut ,

+

(x .. u')A(y - T'l, u'

~

U', v'

~

yr. (14a)

7. UteA) .. U(A), Vt{A) • veAl.

Proot.

Let z

~

V'(A).

Then,

zl(aiJ - aile)
Cl .. Cl .. 0, ze .. 1,
U(A). Now let z (U(A). Then (k is fixed),
1l1li

hence, z

~

Zi a lj .. z1 a1J .. zl(alj .. aik) .. zi alk .. a. ze .. 1,
henoe. z e.

ut (A) •

A symm.etrl0 arsument holds tor V, Vt

•

It is interestIng to note that th$ value ot the multiplier,

a, 1s U'AV', the funct10nal value ot the extremal point.
Also by symmetry',

Cor211m

~.

~

• u .. utA.,.' .. uA.v • p.

It an analytic expaulon of the type (14a)

exists tor xA7, then this expans10n 1s given 1n (14).
Proof.

By Lennaa 6, A ( T(A), a.nd by Lemma 7, U' (A) .. U(A),

V' (A) .. V(A).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20

~~en

game.

UtA) ; 0 and

veAl , 0, A w1ll be oalled a regular

In t1'.1is chapter, concepts of pun1sl'.tm.ent, limbo, and

reward are 1ntroduoed tor regular games..

Homogenei t1 and

convexity principles are found tor these oonoepts wlUoh lead
to simple

01'1 teria

tor choosing optimal strategies..

l?inally,

use 1s made ot these ooncepts to exPress the value and the
optimal strategy sets tor any regular game.

It is assumed

tor the remainder ot this chapter that A is regular.
Simple Game.
Certain

g~es

become tractable immediately

by

means ot

the expression 1n Theorem 1.

uAv, u

~

UtA), v

~

VeAl.

Then A(A) $ uAv, u

~

U(A), v

~

V(A).

~

Lamme. 8, Let XU(A) ; O. Then A(A)
Let ¥V(Al ;
Proot.

o.

By the Main Theorem, there exists a yO

that tor every

X

Y· such

c, X,

> XA:f
X, and use Theorem 1.

A(A)

It XU(A) t} 0, let X

III

U €,

0

•

Then,

uAv
(u - u)A(yO - v)
uAv.
outside members ot this inequalitY' give the first
6.(A) > uAY o

f!'he

~

statement.

III

+

III

Asymmetrio argument will show the statement

tor Y'l(A) ;: O.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21
Tb.~.o£eDl 2.

Let Xt1(A) ; 0, YV(A) ,. 0, and u E.Xt1(A),

v E. YV(A).

'!'hen, A(A)

Proot.

111

UAv,

U E,

X·, v

E.

y. ~

Both statements ot Lemma 8 are valid, and,
uAv

2:

A(A)

2:

uAT.

By Theorem 1, tor every x

~

or A(A)

111

uAV.

X, Y ~ Y,

uAy • uAV + (u ... u)A(y - v) .. uAV,
%Av .. uAv + (x ... u)A(V ... v) .. uAT.
Combine the last three eq.llations and obtain,
uAy ..

6(A) .. %Av tor every x ( X, 1

E.

Y.

'rhis torm demonstrates that u ( X-, v E,yo,
The solution found in Theorem 2 (where the inequality

signs on both sides aTe deleted) 1e called a

s~mn.e ~olu~lon.

A game which has only sim:ple solu"lons will be cal-led a

simple same.

There exists a procedure whicb will find all

solutions ot an arb.i tr&1'1 game, b;r finding simple games

derived trom the arbitrary game.

i~

a finite number ot steps.

The procedure 1s described in (2, Pl'. 27). 'Vihen neither
player has an optimal strategy with a zero component, the
game is called a comnletell miileA im!!.trheorem 3.

l ...et A be a. simple game.

yo .. YV(A) , A{A) .. uAv, u ( UtA), v
Proot.
~~eorem,

Then,
~

X·. m(A)"

veAl.

By tbe definition ot a sim.ple game, and the Main

th$re exist X·, Y· such that it x· ( X·, y. E, Y·,
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then

to~

every x

~

X. Y ~ Y,

x·Ay •

A(A) ,. sAy·,

In partloUlar. this must hold whea x and '1 are unit veotors.
Written In. component
But.

8.8

tOrlll,

therela.tion beoomes,

X0181J • A(A) ,. 8.1JYCt J • tor all 1 andj.
demonstrated in Lel'm.'Lta'1, 'these are equivalent

detinl1;lo11s to (,t) and (13') tor U and V.
JUSO, x· ~ x, yO

yO

t;

'leA).

x·

~

XU(A). y.

~

Y. and this means that

Fl,

YV(A). Eythe

exist, henoe, m(A) ; O. YV(A)

Hence, x· €. U(A),

r~ln

,0.

Theorem, an

XO

and y.

'lhen Theorem 2 applies.

and the entire statement ot the theorem tollows immediately.
With the aid

of:

the conoepts of punishment, labo, and

reward, It will be easy to see that a Oomplete17 mixed game
Is a simple game with unlq,ue elements in its U and V.

J\1"t1 t10lal Games

Artificial gam.es are devIlled in this seetion in order
to study the struoture ot non-simple games more extenslve17_
1~e

definition ot such aD arbitrar,y game is suggested by a

general1zatl~n of the Main Theorem.

Let M be an arbitrary m by m matrix, and oonsider the

transformation,
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Let the set ot all such z be X(M).
arbitrary n by n matrix, let the set

S1m11arly, when N 1$ an
o~

all zt defined by,

zt .. Ny, T ( Y,

be Y(N). X(M) and yeN) are convex hyper-polyhedra ot
dimensions not more thaJl their generators. X and Y.
Le~1

2.

Let A be arbitrary, x have domain X(M), , have

domain Y(N).

Then,
~u.nyxA7 .. lIiU.~yA1.

Proof.

Let x' have dOl:a&in X, "

Then, apply Property 30 to

have domain Y, B .. MAN.

a, x', " to obtain,

Max;d.nyxA7 - Maxx,Miny'x 'MANt' •

.. Maxz·MlllytX'By',

.. MlnytMaxx t x t By',
-Mlny.MuxtXfMANyt I
"M1~.

For the present purpose, M aDd N will be taken such
that X is a subset ot X(M) , and Y is a subset ot Y(N).
'l'h.Ei/n. 14 and N must be non-singular, and satisty,
)(e - e, eN • 8.

fJ:he entire prooeeding can

be

regartled in two ways.

P'irst.

the players keep their strategy sets, X and Y, but playa

new game, B • MAN.
strategy sets

Otherwise, the players alter their

'0 X(M)

and Y(N). and play the original game,
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A, over the new strategy sets.

'rue ohapter uses the latter

point of view, along with conditions on M and N.
Let M be such that X is a subset at XeM) , but otherwise
arbitrary.

Let N .. I, the identity matrix.

Then yeN) .. Y.

Call such an arbitrary geme A(K), and regard the game fi"om
the point of view ot Px • 'Ity is restricted to T, but Px has
the additional freedom ot XC»:). An examination at the game
A(M) oan be made, and methods inv.atlgated by which Px can
reduce strategy choices tram X(M) to X with minimum loss.
In a symmetrio way, a game, A(N),ls detined where
M .. I, and Y is a subset ot yeN).
treedomis given to

Fr.

Here, the additional

and A(N) becomes a tool tor the

investigation ot A by Py_
V~en

Px selects an :It ~ X(M) in
payoff will occur when Py selects a
XAya

a

Ii1~Ay,

A(}~,

ya

E.

the least tavorable
Y suoh that,

-jA .. yu(X).

Px wishes to maximize the payoft, and will try to ohoose an
:I(M) suoh that,

xm (

If

xm ~

M1~A1. MaxxM1~.
X, an optimal strategy tor A has been round.

:J!I "

X, then Px must ohange hi. strategy when playing A.
It turns out that oertain criteria can be established in
It

making the change trom :x: (114) to X.
The prooeeding in A(N) 1s s1m11ar, except that Py
wishes to minimize that payoff rather than maxl1u1ze 1t.
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Let

It f..

X(M) ,

y f..

Y, u

UtA), v

~

E.

VeAl.

ex .. U)A(y .. v))

rJI1~ .. Miny.(llAV ...

Then,
J

.. nAv ... MlUy(X • U)A(y .. v),
.. uAV ... m(x)

t

where,
m(x) .. 1V11n,(x ... u)A(y .. v), x f.. X(M). y t:. Y.

Also, let x f.. X, Y E. yeN) J U

E. UtA).

v f.. V(A)..

~ .. Ma~(w\.v ... (x .. u)A(y .. v)}

.. uAv +

!~(x

.. uAV ..

nCy).

(15)

Then,
J

.. U)A(y .. v) •

where (note minus sign),
n(y) .. - Iv1a:xx (x .. u) A(y ... v). Xf.. Xt Y f.. Y(N).

(le)

l?x will wish to select x to llIElxim.1ze m(x), tor this will
maxim1ze

M1~Y.

this will m1n1m1ze

1>y will also want to maximize n(y), tor
~xA:y.

The use ot the ml.nus sign in

(16) makes the desires ot the players with regard to their

respeotive functions, melt) andn(y>, identical. By this
means, then, aoompletely symmetrical. desoription of the
oriteria tor the two players will be possible.
operators

I~xxJ r~ny

petlnition ;L.

Note that the

are defined over X, Y respectively.

It m(x) < 0 or

ot ;Qunlshmen:t. If mC:} .. 0 or
If' m(x) > 0 or
of' ~lmbo.

n(y)

< 0, x or Y' is a point

n(y) .. 0,
n(y)

>

0.

x or 7 1s a point
x or )" 1s a po1nt

ot r!.'!a£d.
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Let P be the set

o~

all points of punishment tor either

player. L be the set of all point. ot limbo, and R the set
o~

all pOints ot reward.

Then tor Pxt tor example,
P + L + R • X(M) , PL • La • RP • O.

Let PCp), a subset at P, be the set at all points with a
punishment not more than ?, and Rep). a subset ot R, the
set ot all points with a reward not less than p.

Take p > 0

always in either case.

y

~

Then tor PY' say,
pep) implies
.... p S nCy) < 0,

y E.. L

implies

n(y) - 0,

y E.. R(f))

implies

n(y)

->

p

>

o.

Homogeneity and Convexity in
I~isbment,

It x is rewritten a8

Limbo,
U

+

and Reward

(x • u), it is easily seen that

u + y(x .... u). y

>

0

is a halt-ray with its origin at 11 in the direction (x ... u).
The halt-ray does not contain the origin. u.
a

particular value, a point is represented

which 11es between u and x.

by

~~en

y < 1,

the expression

It y > 1, a particular value,

the point lies beyond x trom u.
Similarly, the expression,

v + y(y .. v), y > 0,
is a halt-ray with the

s~~e

connotation as described above.
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The91em 4,

Let:x ( it(M), u

m(u ...

rex ..

Let

u»

f.

U, Y ~ O.

.. yttt(u ... (x .. u»

yeN), v ( V. y?! O.

'!I (

Then,
.. ym(x).
Then,

n(v + y(y ... v)) .. yn(v ... (1 .. v)) .. yn(y).

Proot.

By (15), y

m(u ... y(x .. u»

f.

(17)
(la)

y, and,

..

~nny(u

..

r(x .. u) .. u)A(y .. v)

.. Idln,r(x .. U)A(y" v),
.. yMlny(x .. u).A(,. - v) •

.. ym(x) - ym(u ... ex ... u).
The second statement follows a similar argument using (16).
Cgrollarl ih
l~oof.

m(llA:)

Let Y -

1s a subset 0'1 L, VY(.N) is a subset ot L.

0 in Theorem 4.

Il'b.en m{u) -0.

Asimilar

argument holds tor VY(N).

Theorem 4: establishes U and T as centers ot homogeneity
in punishment, 11mbo, and reward.

By

themselves contain only limbo poiats.

Corollary 2, U and V
It any point ot a

half-raY' has the property of pUnitllmlent, limbo, or reward,
then every point of the halt-raJ has the same property.

Both

the punishment and the reward inonase as the point moves
away :trom. the origin of the halt-ray. u or v.

.11'rom the

point ot view ot either player, the punishment should be
minimized, and the reward maximia8d.

It a player is required

to ohoose a strategy trom a halt-ray- with origin u or v,
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Theorem 4 ma.kes the ello! co an· easJ one,.

Sinoe every PQint

of a halt.ray has the same property, the bait-ray may be
reterred to as a. pWlis:b.'ment. limbo, or reward half-ray.

P£!itel"!OQ;&t

Let a pl8.,.e1" t $ oho1H ot strategy be restrioted

to a closed subsetot a half-ray with origin u or v.
On e. punishment half-ray, the player sbould select the
strategy nearest u or v.
On a 11Il1bo halt-ray, the player may select any stra.tegy

ot the subset.
On a reward balt-rtll.l. the player should seleot the

strategy farthest from u or v.
In particular, thlscriterion can be used in applying

A(M) or A(N) to A bycons1der1ng the intersection of a given.
b.alt-.ray w1 tll it or Y.

Ii' U I. X

or v I. Y, the intersection

will be olosed, and the ol"lterlon wIll be valId.

Points of a subeet ot

~

or En can be desoribed 1n terms

of a fIxed set ot veotors w1 tb orisins u or v.
oonslder the dftserlptlon ot x

t;

11'01'

instanoe.

X in the following way.

.1.

Write the unit vectors ot ~ as
Then.
x • X18 1 • u + (x181 ... u) • u + %1(.1 - u).
From a practIcal standpoint, this fixed set has adVantages In
that all ooetti,ciente (the

%j)

ar. positive. and that the

property of eaoh halt-ra11n the set 1s

89.SY

to oaloulate.
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Lemma .0.

L$t x e, X(M) t xt e, XU"). 0

m(ctX ... (1 .... «) x')

->

Let Y E. Y(N), yt

n(tty + (1 ... a)yt)
Proof.

Il'he

.~

~ a ~ 1.

'!'hen,

CImex) +(1 .... a)m(x').
E.

Y(N), 0 S ct .:$ 1.

(19)

'I'll,en,

an(y) ... (1 .... a)n(y').

proot 01' (19) will make use ot (15), and the

inequality,

Miny(t(y) ... g(y»

~ Ml¥(;y) ...

111ny.s(y)'

Using these, one obtains,
m(ctx'" (1 .... a)x') • l~ny(a.x ... (1 .... «)x' ....

u)A(y .. v),

• Min,(a.(x .... u)A(y ... v)

... (1 - a)(x' .... U)A(y ... v)),
i:~l!i¥ (x ... u) A(y ... v)

...

~ttny(l

~ a~any(x

... G}(x' ... U)A(y ... v),
... u)A(y ... v)

... (1 ... u)W4ny(x' ... u)A(y - v),

>
'me statement ot
tl~t

(20)

the operator ...

direction as

~tlny.

(1 ... a)m(x').
-can be shown
similarly.
a.m(x) ...

1~

It turns out

gives the inequality in the same

That is,

• M~(t(x) ... S(x}) ~ (- Mu::JI(x)

... (- Me.~g(x)).

By means ot this lemma, the tollowing two theorems

charaoterize the sets, R(p) and pep).

'rhe oonditions tor

the characterization at pep) may seem especially stringent,
but later results will support them.
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ThIP;rem I.
Proof.

R (p) :1s convex.

Let x

~

R(p). xt

~

< 1. Then
must be
R(p). Use Lemma 12. Then,

R(p), 0 < u

shown that ax + (1 .... «)x' • x"

~

it

m.(ax + (1 .... (I) x') ~ «m(lt) + (1 .. ahn.{x')
~

Uence, x"
Theorem

f..

o.

R(p) and l1(p) is convex.
Let Z be a convex sub..t of X t or Y'» and in

&t

addition, let ZP • Z.
Proof.

up + (1 .... alp • p >

t

Then, ZP(p) :1s convex.

Let x e" zp(p) t x'

e.

ZP(p). O.s a

be shown that ax + (1 - a)x' • x"
of Z, ZP • Z, and Lemma 12.

o > m(ax +

(1 .. (1)X')

e"

S 1.

ZP(p).

~en:1t

must

Use the convexity

Then,

- .. up .. (1 .. alp • .... p.
>

am(::) + (1 .... «)m(x t

)

~

Hence, x"

f..

ZP(p), and ZP(p) is convex.

Consider the set of all point •. wi.th reward exactly p..

By Theorem 5, this set 1s oontaintd in a convex set.
Consider one such pOint and by combining the statements ot

Theorem 4 and Corollary 1, notice that the point is not an
element of U or V, hence there exists a halt-ray ,dth origin
u or v through the point; then every neighborhood of this

point contains a point ot the halt-ray not in R(p). that 1s.
every neighborhood ot a point with reward exactly p contains
points not in R(p).

Thus. the set ot all points with reward

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31
exaotly- p lies on the boundarY' ot R(p).

On the other hand,

it a point has reward different trom p, say
l1es on the boundary ot

RCe),

~,

this point

and 1s a tinite distance along

a halt-ray trom u or v tram the boundary at R(p).

2be

boundary ot Rep) oannot l1e along a halt-ray tor a finite
distance, henoe, the set ot points with reward exaotly p is
the boundary ot the oon",·ex set n (p) •

Similarly t the set at

all points at punishment exactly p 1s the boundary at PCp),
and under the conditions ot Theorem 6, Is the boundary ot

a convex set.

14t Px consider all sets at equ.i-reward or equ1punishm.ent paints in A(M). In X(M) , which is supposed to

contain X, tllese sets may intersect X or not, depending on
the

n~g.nitude

of the punishment or reward.

In view ot

Criterion 1, it is wiShed to select a strategy in X in
suoh a we.:1 that every nelgb.bortlood of the strategy oontains
pOints not in X.
sele~ted t

On the other banA, It suoh a strategy 1s

and other points ot Its .qui-reward or stIu1.

punishtnent set have neIghborhoods contained completely in
:I. then Theorem" says a greater reward or a less punish-

ment oan be obtained along a. ray through u and the point.
Px should tind a set, R(p) or P~p) whioh has a nonempty interseotion with X, but which has no point \nth a

Henoe.

neighborhood contained entirely in X.
tangent to X.

This set Is, then,

It the oondltions of Theorem 6 hold, the
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intersection
Cr1;ter10n 2,

ot'

the sets in either case will be oonvex.

Let either player be required to select a

strategy from,a convex subset of
contains e1ther only points ot

ot reward.

:x or Y respeotively. which

pua1s~nent

or only points

Then, the player should select a strategy from

the eonvex subset ot X or Y which 11es in the oonvex set

ot

tangency between a set

ot equi-reward

or equ1-punislnllent

and the given subset.

The oompletely mixed game can be disposed ot at this
time.

Suppose A is oompletely mixed.

Then no optimal

strategy tor either player has a zero component. 1.e. no
optimal strategy lies on the boundary ot X or Y. Th1s means
the optimal strategies are not chosen from a punishment
set or

8.

reward set; henoe they must be ohosen trom limbo

sets of the two players.

But the.. opt1ma1 strategies

cannot be ohosen tram a limbo halt-ray, tor otherwise
Criterion 1 says points on the bOWlde.ries ot X and Y would
also be optimal.
and V.

l~us,

the point. must be chosen trom U

Again, U and V must each have a unique element, tor

otherwise, Theorem ! says points on the boundary would be

optimal.

Hence, the unique elements u

~

U(A), v ( V(A) are

optimal strategies, and the game 1s simple.
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Solutions :for Hegular Games

The pun1shtlent _ limbo, and r.ward sets belonging to
the two players stem trom. two difterent considerations ot
Some ot the interdependenoes involved

the same matrIx, A.

in this are demonstrated here.
~!!! ~lt

Let the domain ot x be X, the domain 01' y be Y.

Then,
l\i!U,fL (x)

Proot.

III

...

Max,.n tV) •

Use will be :made ot (30), and the Identity,

MaxzF(x}

l1li

...

Th~nx(-

F(x»),

which can be verified on inspeotion.
the variable killed by MaXx or

Recall in (15). (16),
had domain X or Y. Then,

M1~

May(:::) • !lIQXx(M1~ ... uAv),
== rJfaXx~a~

...

\lAy,

.. 1\11n, M'8.XxXA7 .. u,Av,
==

Mlny(u.AV ... n(y)} ...

.. UAV ...
l1li

Lemme.

*2,

...

.M1Zly<'"

n(,.)) ... uAv,

£iIaxyn (y) •

XR'; 0 it and only it Y.P .. Y.
YR, 0 it and only it lP ..

Proot.

\lAV,

x.

It XR .; 0, then l':l1ay(x) > 0, x

11, Maxyn(y) < 0, 1 (Y.
punishment, and

yP

III

l~nce,

f..

X, and by Lemma

Y oontains only points ot

Y.
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On the other hand, it yP - Y, Y contains only points ot
punishment, and

~~xyn(y)

< 0, y

May(x) >0. x €. X,and XR r} O.

~

Y. By Lemma 11 then,
The second stat$Ulent

follows a symmetric argwnent.
i£emma 13.
Proof.

XR.,

Q

and YIi ., 0 it and only it XL ; 0 and YL " o.

Let XR .. 0 and YR .,

o.

Ilhen, XL ,. 0 or XP .. X.

The

latter case is impossible, tor it true, lR ;. 0, by Lemma 12,
violating the hypothesis.

Ilene., XL ,. O.

BY' interchanging

X and Y in the argument, YL ., 0 also.
Let XL ; 0 and YL ,,0.

Then XR .. 0 or XR ., O.

The

latter ca.se 1s impossible, for it tru.e, yP • Y, and YL .. 0,
violating the hypothesis.

Hence D .. O.

It tollows, by

interchanging X a.nd Y, that YR • 0 also.

Tbeorem '11

Every regular gam.e is in one and only one ot the

three olasses detined by the oond1tions below.
A.

XR.. 0 and YR •

B.

lR;

C. YR

o.

o.

r O.

In addition,equivalent conditions tor A, B. and OJ
respeotively, are given in Lemma 12 and Lemma 13.

Proot.

A. B. and

0: exhaust all possibilities except XR

and YR ; O. which 1s impossible by Lemma 12.
exhaust all regular games.

'1 0

Hence, they

Their mutual exclusiveness can
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be seen immediately by th. torms of the oonditions.

nenoe,

every regular game must be in one and only one 01' the classes.
Classes Band C are essentially the same type with an interohange of players.

It XR

~

0, then, by Lemma 12, YP • Y.

Let Y be the oonvex set in the oond1tion$

01'

Theorem 6.

Then, XR(p) and YP(p) are both. oonvex sets. By Criterion 2,
eaoh

set

the players should seleot a strategy trom the oonvex

01'

tangenoy between X or Y and the eq,u.i-r&ward or equI-

01'

punishment set tangent to X or Y.
equi-reward set be

p..

Let the reward on the

Then, by Lemma 11, the punishment

on the equi-punishment set is also pO.
Theorem

a,

Let A be regular, u

~

U(A), v

~

VeA), p. the

reward 01' an equI-reward .et tangent to X or Y.
01'

Then, eaoh

the exhaustive, but mutuallY exolusive. olasses, given

in 'Theorem. 7, have values and solutions as given below.

A.
XO

It lR • 0 and YR • O. then

= XL,
B.

~(A)

• uAv,

y. = YL.

It XR , 0, then A(A) • UAv + pO,

XO • XR(p.). Y· • lP(pO).

It YR .; 0, then A(A) =- uAv ... pO,

C.

X· • XP(p·), y •• YR(p.).
A. Let XR =- 0 a.nd YR =- o. 1'tum XL .; 0 and

Proot.
Let xl/)

t:,

XL, y. e, YL, then, tor every x

e.

X, yo

$,

yt .;

Y,
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x" Ay

XAy"

2!: Mlnyx·A1
S MaXxUY·

III uAy + m(x") .. uAy,
III uAv ... n ("10 ) .. uAv ..

Combine these inequalities, with the result,

x" A¥ 2:

uAv

2!:

xAy° j

which displays statement A.
Let x"

B.

~

XR(p") , "1"

~

lP(p·).

Then, tor every

x ( X. Y t; Y.

.

x"Ay ~ M1¥"Ay .. \lAv + m(xO) ?; uAv + p ••
%.A:y0

S

~.~.:y.

UAv ... n (y. )

:!i

uAv + p ••

That is,

x·Ay

~

uAV + p" ?; xAyo.

whioh displays statement B.
Let

C.

x e, X t Y

€,

XO E.

XP(p·). y.

~

'I'hen, tor eyery

YR(p").

Yt

x°Ay ?;
xAy'0

:M1V°A1'

S l'VlaXxxAyo
X"A::!

~

III uAv + m(x·) ?; uAy ... pO t
• uAv ... n(yO)

uAv ... p. ~

.s uAv

.. p ••

xlJ°,

whioh displays statement O.
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The operator, T(W.f,t,S), slve11 in (13) Is defined for
an arbitrary game, A.

It will be shown in this chapter that

T divides all games ot a given size into sets ot games which
are equivalent in a certain sense.

So.me ot the invariants

ot these classes ot equivalent games are investigated.

In

addition, the structural relationship between regular and
irregular games Is studied.
Equivalence ot A and fA
Recall trom (13) that,
B • TA • T(wij,y,tl,8j)A • D ... yE ... F ... G

means that.
bij • wpq (alj ... 8.iq- 8.pj ...

pq ) ... Y ... t1 ... Sj,
where. epqwpq • 1, and y,tl,SJ are completely arbitrary.
8.

The operator T(W' .r' ,tt .Sf) will be written 1ft. and s1m1larly
'1'''

If the operation 1s iterated, say TT'A, a typical

etc.

entry ot this element is
wpq(w'rs(aij .. ais .. 8.r j ...

8.

re )

+ y' ... ttl + gf j

... w're(aiq - ais ... arq ... ars) ... yt ... tti ... S'q
-wtrs{spj .... a ps ... arj + are) _ yt _tf p - g' j
+ w'rs(a pq ... ape - arq ... are) ... yt + it p + g'q)
+ y

+,

ti ... gj'

whioh reduces to,
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Wpq (aij .. aiq .. f:lpj ... a p (1) ... Y ... 1'i ... Sj'

an entry of TA.

That is,
(21)

TT'A • TA.
Definition 2t

If for some '1', 13 • TA, denote the relation

between B and A
Theorem 9t
Proof.

by

13 r A.

BrA 1s an equivalence relation.

Reflex! vi ty, symm.e.try, and trans! tivi ty must

be

shown tor 13 r A.
Reflexivity.

Let T be selected by means of Ler.'WQ 6 in

suoh a way that TA • A.
Symmetry.

Then, A r A.

Let 13 r A, then B • TA.

T'A. At and use (21).

Seleot T' suoh that

Then,

A • TtA • TiTA • T'B,
henoe, ArB.
Transitivity_

Let C r B. B r A, then, 0 • TB, 13 • T'A.

Choose 'I'M suoh that TffA • A.

Then,

henoe, Are.
Let a set ot games ot the same size
Au •••••

be

given, say

At

A',

Then, by (21), a fixed T will classify these games

by the alternatives TA .. TAt or fA rJ TAt.

In the tirst case,

A and A' are in the same equivalenoe set, T(A). In the
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latter case, A and At a.re not in the same equIva.lence set.
On the other hand, by

6, an a.rbitrary game has a

Lelmlla

representation, A • TA

to~

some T.

Hence, all games are

divided into classes of games 'where all games of a'single
class a.re equivalent in the sense 01" Definition 2.
'me relation betweenresular and irregular games is

taken up now, and ultimat.ly 1"inds oharacterization in the
arguments

01"

LemPl!: 14,

T.

Let a

E,

X'.

b

Let A be arbitrary.

E'..

yf

hereatter.

Then there exists,and can be

constructed" a B • A + F + G whiCh is regular.
1)1'001".

By Lemma 5, U(B) ;

it and only it there exists no

0

t which satisfies,

(A + F + G)t • e. et •

o.

Let It be fixed, and detine g by the relation,
Sj • 1 - flkj tor all

3.

let 1 be fixed, and detine t by the rela.tion,
1"1 • 1 ... ail tor all 1.

Suppose a set 01" t exists tor which et • O. Then,
(aij + 1"i
It

+

gj)tj • aljtj

+

1"teJtij + ejtj ... Qkjtj • 1.

et • 0, this reduces to,
8.1jtj - 8.kJtj

=-

1 tor all i.

IrMs Is clearly impossible when i • k, tor the lett side is

then zero.

In a similar way. the detinition of twill

guarantee that V(B)

1 o.
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1'heorem 101

Let

A be regular, u E. U(A), v

l£.

V(A).,

'rhen,

A .. T(U,Vq.uAV,O,O)A.
Proof.
Wpq ..

Recall the construction ot A in Lemma 6, and let

upvq •

'rhen,

A .. T(U1VJ'- UpapqYq •• pupaiqVq,Up8pJeqVq)A,

.. '1'(U1V.1'. uAV,al qvq ,Up ap .1)A.
But by Lemma 9, the vectors in the last two argwnents are
uAv tor all 1 or 3, hence.

A .. T(UIV3'. UAv,UAve,uAve)A,
.. D ... uAvE + UAvB + UAvE •
.. D + uAvE,

Corol.I£l 3,
b

~

Let T .. T(albj'Y'O,O).

~en,

a

~

V(TA) ,

V(TA) , Y .. a.TAb. (Oon•• quently, TA 1s regular.)

Proot.

substitute a into (7 t "

with the result,

r

8.1(8.1' (ai.1 ... 8.Iq ... apj + apq)bq +
... ftp(aUc ... a1q ... fipk + apq)b q ... Y) .. 0,

which reduces to,

&i(&13 -

a1k} ~ ap(apJ ... &Pk) .. O.

Both ten.;;; ·:.n the lett are ldent1 cal, hence a €. U(TA). 'I'he

assertion tor b can be verifIed in a similar way, and TA
is regular.

Then using (81), TA" TTA, one can apply
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Let A be arbitrary.

Corollary 4,

A III T(UiVj,UBv,t,g)A, u

where B, t and
:Proof.

g

~

Then, A Can De written,

U(B). v

~

V(B),

are detlned in Lemma 14.

Use Lemma 14 and

Theorem. 10.

Invariants ot T(A)

Consider the following relations,
uOi(alj ... aik)

III

0, for all J, a fixed k,

(6.i3 - akJ)voJ

III

0, for all 1,

eiuoi

III

Ii

fixed k,

0, ejvoJ • 0,

and let the set of all u· satisfying these relations be UO,
the set ot all such v· be

vo.

UOCA), V·(TA)

r;['h~orem

11,

Proot.

U·(TA) is defined by the following relations,

UOCTA)

III

III

V·(A).

UOi(wpq(aiJ ... aiq .... 6.pJ ... 6.pq) + Y ... f1 ... 8j
... Wpq (alk .. 6.1q .. apk ... a pq ) ... Y ... f1 ... ~)

III

0,

III

O.

utepq'Wpq(aiJ .... a1lt) .. eiUOieq'Wpq(apJ ... apk;)
... elu·l(gj .. 8k}

The last two terms are zero by definition ot u·, and
uOl(alJ ... 81k)
Hence. u· E. U· (A).

III

O.

iI'he reduction is reversible, hence, the

first assertion 1s true.

A symmetric argument will

demonstrate the second statement.
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001'0118.1'15,

IAt UO ( UO(A) , v·

~

VO(A), T· T(a1bJ'Y'o,O).

Then, a + UO • U ( U(TA). b + yO • V
Proot.

~

V(TA).

Both a and u· satisty the homogeneous relations (7')

and their sum will likewis. satisty the relations.
e(a + u·) • 1 + 0 • 1, so u satisties (10).

Also,

A symmetric

argument \'fill prove the assertion tor V.
It may occur to the reader that an extension ot the

equIvalence classificatioA,by dropping the requirement that
epqwpq • 1 can be effected.

In particu~ar, 1~eorem 9 and

crheorem 11 do not need the restriotion.

In taot, the entire

function ot the restriotion is to guarantee that the expansion

will represent the original xAy, and not a multiple ot xAy.
In place of this extenslou, the reader is ret.,:ft'"ed to the
concepts in Property 3B.
In view ot the facts noted previously, nmaely,

l(TA) • T(A) , UO(TA) • UO(A), VO(TA) • VetA),

none ot these sets depend on A explicitly, except that A
has generated a class ot elements, TA.

Let an index, n,

be assigned to each class, and writ.,

T • T(n) , UO • UOCn),

Vo •

VOen).

ThUS, tor a given ", there is a set ot games, Or ruatrlces,
and a subspace ot each I,mand En in correspondence.
means ot the results above, any regular game oan be
expanded as a fUnotion ot" and T.
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Theorem 12,

Let UO

T .. T(a b ,r,OtO).

~ UO(rt) ,

v·

~

VO(n). A

Il'hen, tor x

~

X'. Y

~

~

T(n) ,

yt.

xTAy .. Y + (x - a - UO)A(y - b - yO).

Proof.

TA is regular by Qorollary 3.

The values at P, U t

and v in 'rheorem 1 are given in Oorollary 3 and Corollary 5.
Thus the expansion ot every regular game 1s a fUnotion
of n and T.

y has the etteet 01" translating the value ot the

game, but alters the strategy considerations not at all.

The

essential oharaoter of all regular games in a olass is then
contained in the subset a.etined by T

l1li

T(ai b3'O,O,O) .. Tab'

Call this subset TO(n),
Every alemen' ot

Theore 13,

Proof.

Let

A

To (n)

has the same rank.

be of minimum rank in T(n), say at rank r.

'l"hen , an entry ot A can be wrl tten,
81j •
An

entry of B

~

gl~kJ

where k

l1li

1,2 f

••••

r.

TO(n) is,

bij .. ap(gl~kJ - 81khkq - SpkhkJ + gpkhkq)bq ,
III

a p (Slk - 8pk) (hkj .. hkq) bq f

g'lkh'kJ'
Now, B cannot be less than rank r, tor otherwise A is not of
III

minimum rank.

On the other hand, B oannot be of rank more

than r, by reason ot the torm displayed above.

Hence B is

ot rank exactly r, and B is a typical element ot rO(11).
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00rollar1 6..

Let

the minlm:um rank in T(TT) be r.

Then,

every element of T(TT) is ot rank r, r ... 1, or r + 2, not
exceeding 141n(m,n), and e.ery regular element of T(n) is
of rank r or r ... 1..

In addition,
r ;$ Min(m,n) .. 1.

Proot...

Any

element at T(Tt) can be expressed by the Inethod

in Theorem 15 as, tor a typical entry,

i'ith'k3 ... Y ... tl ... Sj , k • 1,2, ... ,1".
Now y can be absorbed in t or S, sinoe both are arbitrary.
bij·

Hence, any element is ot

~ank ~t

Most r ...

a.

It B is

regular, it has a representation with t • 0, g • 0, and
hence, is

01'

rank at most r ... 1.

For the last assertion,

consider liJ,q' detined in (et), which is an element at

ro (n) ,

and has a zero row and a zero column.

Some Speoial Classes
Elements and properties at some spec1al sets are
displayed here to illustrate the analYsis above.
T(1i:) ,

where the matrix E 1s taken as the index, 1s the

set at all games 'With the typical entry,
alj • apoq{l - 1 - 1 ... 1) ... Y + 1'1 ... gj'

that is,
A .. F ... G,

where yE has been aosorbed into the arbitrary F and G.
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contains only one elemtmt. the matrix 0, and.
U· (E) == XI, V· (E) == Y'.

The set or all regular games ot the class is yE, and the
set ot all irregular games. is :r + Gt where t ;. eta or g ;. \3e.
'r.he minimum rank Is zero, all regular elements are ot ranlt
zero or one, and the irregular elements are ot ranl( one or

two.
T(I)

J

where I is the identity rnatrix (slluare), is the

set ot all games with the typioal entry, where I .. (olj)'
B.lj ~

8 p bq (oij

.. 0Iq- 0p3 + 0pq) ... Y + t1

+

Sj •

.. 013 - bi - 83 + ab + y + it + gj.

That is,
A ...1 + :Ft- G,

rO(I) contains all games ot the torm,
\Pfhere to E. Xt , gO E. Y' .. 'lb.e spaces associated with I are
the zero vectors, written as,

UO(I) .. (0), VO(I) • (0).
I ;.

To (I).

and is translated by y .. lIn from. the game t
I .. Ijn

E.,

r" (I) •

frne minimum rank is n .. 1, which demonstrates the attainment
ot the maximum given in the bound ot Corollary 6.
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:.METHODS .A;ND OONJECTURES

Methods
Consider the game (2, p. 69),
A-

1

... :3

.. 2

1

a

0

0

•

°

12

This game is regular, and the subspaees assooiated with its
class are the zero vector..

il"hat is, u· - (o).

vo -

(0).

Then, there is a unique u or v. 1'h8Y turn out to be, on
calculation by (7'), (8'), and (10),
u - v •

(12/23, 12/23, .. 1/23), uAv • .. 12/23.

It is easy to see that,
~taxi:Mlnjaij

=-

0,

and, since
uAv + 111(X) • Mi~A1.
uAv + May(x) .. I'I!a~nyxAy

2:

t.laxIMinjaij - O.

That is,

Mayt(x)

~

... uAv .. 12/23,

hence, .RX ; 0, and by Lemma 12, py .. y.
Consider the oone given by, x

z

II1II

(a, 1 - a, 0).

II1II

U

By Theorem 4, m(x)

subset of this cone when 0 ::; a

:5.

+ y(z ... u), where
II1II

1, and y

ym(z).

X is a

2: 1 for all

points of X.
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By definition,
m(z) .. MinyZAy ... uAv.
• M[n(3a ... 34/23, 35/23 ... Sa, 12/23).

l'hat is,
34/23 when

(t

S

1/2,

m{z) .. 35/23- 3a when

(1

~

1/2.

m(z) ..

3a, ...

The punishment, limbo, and reward sets oan then be
seen by comparing m(z) with zero.

'1l1is gives,

< 54/69 and a > 35/69,

z

~

P when u

z

~

L when a .. 34/69 and « .. 35/69,

z

~

R when 34/69 <

~

< 35/69.

The homogeneity ot punishment, limbo, and reward makes it
easy to see that these sets are oones with vertioes at u.
'rhe limbo halt-rays separate the punismlent and reward sets,
and serve as asymptotes tQr equi-reward or equi-punismnent
ourves in the plane X'.

By the symmetry, it is apparent

that the point ot tangenoy between X and an equi-reward
set will be along the halr-ray defined by
u as tar as possible, namely to (0,
~~(x)

o.

1).

(l

.,

1/2, out trom

'rhen,

• 12/23 .. pO.

Thus, (0, 0, 1) is optimal, and A .. uAv ... p ...
Let y .. v ... y(z ... v). z defined as above.
n(y) ., yn(z).

o.
'!'hen,

By oalculation,

n(z) • - MaxxXAZ ... uAv,
• ... ~mx(3a ... 34/23. 35/23 - 3a, 12/23),
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which becomes,

n(z) • 3a - 35/23 when a
n(z) • - 12/23
n(z) • 34/23 -

~

when 1/3
~

when a

~

1/3,
~

Q.

;$ 2/3,

2/3.

Py has only punishing pOints, hence wants to stay as close
to v as I}Ossible on a.ny given halt-ray trom. v. This set ot
points is z when 0

S a S 1,

and by inspection above,

l&axzn(z) • - 12/23 when 1/3
and z so defined Is opt1m.l tor P,...

~

a S 2/3,

It is interesting to

note that the curves ot equi-punishment in yt are straight

- -

line segments inSide the aubset where 0 < a < 1, and curvi-

linear elsewhere.

OOIlJ e ot'\.U"es
t~le

relation between regular and irregular games needs

further eXamination, espeoially the role ot F and G as
functions ot the solutions ot the irregular games.

One

specific inquiry would be the following_

Question 1, Let A be irregular.

When does there exist a

5, F. and G such that B ia regular, and,
A •. B ... F ... G,

XO(B)XO(F)

~

0, yO(B)yO(G)

~

O?
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It the intersection of either player listed were not

zero, then the set would be optiIl1al.
l.'he analysis has treated
deletion ot its components.

aJ1

entire given game with no

However, certain ga:m.es are

eith.er SOlvable on inspeotion, or oan be simplified by easily
seen deletions.

It would be 8.n adVantage it these games

oould be reoognized within the framework
A

01' the

stri otll de,terzq1ned game A is a game such the. t

analysis,
t

I~xl1ttnjaiJ • M1nJ!~iaijt

and is solvable on inspection.

;I.!;very class, T(n) J has

strictly determined games, tor instanoe,
grunss may be regular or irregular.

G B..re strictly determined. but
are

irre~11ar

11uestion 2,

l~

~qJ

and these

As examples, E, F, and

is regular while ]' and G

in general.
Oan the condition that

til

game be strictly

determined be expressed entirely as a tunction 01' T?

;Jyrmlletrlc games have taken on new importance recently
pp. 73), (2, pp. 81), with certain oomputational methods
01' solution,

and new methods 01' sywuetrizlng arb1trary games.

A sr.mnetric game has a ske\V-symrlletric payott matrix and it
is ea.sily verified that t1 .. V.

Henoe, it the pa.yoff is A,

uAv • 0. '\l\I'hich lU.eans that it A is rebl'lllar, then A f.

r

e

(rr).

'l"hon by Theorem 13, unless theminimu.lll rank 01' a olass is even
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there exist no regular symmetric games in the class.

It

can be shown easily that a necessary and sufficient oondition
that a class have either a. sYltl:rlletric or skew.... syrnruetric pe:yoft
l:uatri:x is that Taa produce a sym;m.etric or skew",sYluul.etric

matrix, respectIvely.

This means, then, that a class cannot

have both a syrmnetrlc a.nd a sktSf".synunetric matrix.

Sinoe the elements ot a class play no special role in
its definition, it seams that some particular T

mi~lt

be

convenient to display an Sle111ent of' each cla.ss for oompa.rison
and identifica.tion purpos.,s.

'v\!ith no baSis to ravor one a or

b over another, it seems reasonable to let a. • elm, b • e/n.
If this were done, this representative element would display
the ex'stence ot

s~mnetrlc

or akew-synlmetrlc elements in the

class immediately.
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